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 Uncertain climate policy and the Green
Paradox






Unintended consequences of announcing a climate policy well in ad-
vance of its implementation have been studied in a variety of situa-
tions. We show that a phenomenon akin to the so-called “Green-
Paradox” holds also when the policy implementation date is uncertain.
Governments are compelled, by international and domestic pressure, to
demonstrate an intention to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Taking
actual steps, such as imposing a carbon tax on fossil energy, is a diﬀer-
ent matter altogether and depends on a host of political considerations.
As a result, economic agents often consider the policy implementation
date to be uncertain. We show that in the interim period between
the policy announcement and its actual implementation the emission of
green-house gases increases vis-` a-vis business-as-usual.
“......If you have to shoot, shoot, don’t talk!” – Tuco in The Good,
the Bad and the Ugly.
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An increasing body of economic literature suggests that the very large
potential damage due to emissions-induced climate change calls for eﬀective
regulation measures to limit the accumulation of atmospheric pollution. The
costly measures would be justiﬁed only if the response they entail actually
advances the desired goal of reduced emissions. Recent studies reveal, how-
ever, that this is not always the case, and climate policies may paradoxically
give rise to more emissions relative to the laissez-faire scenario. For example,
partial participation in an international emission reduction program may in-
troduce a leakage eﬀect, whereby the response of the non-participating parties
more than oﬀsets the reduction activities of the participants. The resulting
“Green Paradox” is analyzed, for example, by Sinn (2008) and by Eichner and
Pethig (2009). A similar paradoxical outcome may stem from the regulator’s
wish to allow the parties prepare in advance to the proposed policy measures
and spread their adjustment eﬀorts over time. A model based on this mecha-
nism has been developed by Di Maria et al. (2008) who study the response of
coal or oil ﬁelds owners to an advance announcement of an anticipated climate
policy and ﬁnd that the inelastic supply of the non-renewable resources might
induce them to lower prices prior to the policy implementation, encouraging
enhanced emissions.
At the core of the mechanisms driving these results lies a ﬁnite resource
stock that owners wish to exploit before the announced policy interrupts their
supply activities. In a recent contribution, Smulders et al. (2009) show that
scarcity is not the sole driver of such eﬀects and obtain the paradoxical outcome
in a model with an unlimited supply of fossil energy. Introducing regulation
via a carbon tax, which eﬀectively raises the price of fossil energy, and assuming
that the regulator announces the plan to levy the tax well in advance, they
show that the early announcement distorts resource allocation processes in a
number of ways. In particular, it reduces consumption and increases saving,
thus giving rise to a larger capital stock. The larger capital stock, in turn,
enhances the demand for fossil energy by ﬁrms that use capital, energy and
labor as factors of production. Thus, announcing a policy aimed at reducing
the use of fossil energy well in advance gives rise to the opposite eﬀect until the
policy is actually realized. The result holds both when the regulation policy
involves a mild tax rate which reduces fossil use but does not induce the use
of alternative, clean (solar) energy as well as when the tax rate is high enough
to trigger a transition to solar energy.
In this work we extend the results of Smulders et al. (2009) by consider-
1ing uncertainty as yet another driver of paradoxical eﬀects. We incorporate
uncertainty into the model by assuming that the government announces the
intention to levy the carbon tax, but the date of implementation depends on
political conditions and is therefore uncertain. The distinction appears to be
important as it aﬀects the underlying mechanism that drives the paradox. In
particular, the continuity of the consumption process plays a key role in deriv-
ing the early announcement eﬀect when the implementation date is known in
advance. In contrast, under uncertain implementation date, the consumption
path undergoes a discontinuous jump at the (random) time when the policy is
implemented. Nevertheless, we establish the “green paradox” also under un-
certainty, and show that it is driven by the same economic forces: anticipating
that the tax will reduce energy use in the future induces households to enhance
saving today in order to accumulate more capital that can substitute for the
lower energy input. Prior to implementation of the tax policy, the increased
capital stock is associated with increased energy input, hence the paradoxical
outcome. Indeed, since uncertainty regarding implementation appears to be
a common feature characterizing climate policies, the negative eﬀect of the
paradox may be signiﬁcant.
Of course, the saving eﬀorts must come at the expense of consumption,
and the realization of the eﬀect depends on a condition relating the production
elasticity of capital to the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. As
explained by Smulders et al. (2009), this condition would be satisﬁed in any
empirically relevant calibration, and the paradoxical nature of the uncertainty
eﬀect appears to be robust.
2 Setup
We begin with a brief summary of the unregulated case on which the early
announcement analysis is based.
2.1 The unregulated economy
Early responses to expectations regarding the future introduction of a cli-
mate policy are studied in the framework of Tsur and Zemel (2009) who an-
alyzed the penetration of solar technologies into competitive energy markets.
We outline brieﬂy the main components of this model and the results that drive
the present analysis. The economy consists of a ﬁnal good sector, an energy
sector, and capital owning households. The ﬁnal goods are produced using






with  + 
 < 1 and F > 0.1 The energy sector consists of fossil energy ﬁrms
that supply energy at the price  and of solar energy ﬁrms that invest in solar
infrastructure (capital) s. Once the latter has been installed, the generation
of solar energy entails no additional cost but is limited by the available stock
s of solar capital. The two sources of energy are perfect substitutes, hence
x = x
f + bs (2.2)
where xf is fossil energy and b > 0 is an eﬃciency parameter measuring how
much solar power can be delivered from one unit of solar capital. Solar energy
is supplied at the going market price and the forward-looking solar ﬁrms base
their investment decisions on their forecast regarding the evolution of future
energy demand. The solar stock, then, evolves according to
˙ s =    s (2.3)
where  is the investment rate and  > 0 is the capital depreciation rate.
Household have a concave utility function u() over consumption c of ﬁnal





subject to the budget constraint
˙ k = y(k;x
f + bs)   x
f      k   c; (2.5)
where  is the pure (utility) rate of discount.
Absent market failures, the competitive equilibrium processes are deter-
mined by ﬁnding nonnegative fc(t);xf(t);(t)g that maximize (2.4) subject to
(2.3),(2.5), k(0) = k0 > 0 and s(0) = 0.
The competitive allocation is characterized in Tsur and Zemel (2009) in
terms of the critical price

c = ( + )=b (2.6)
and three conditions:
1All quantities are given in per capita terms, hence the labor input is omitted. The
CD speciﬁcation is not essential for our analysis, but it allows for a simple and transparent
derivation.

































3. A simultaneous growth condition, equating the marginal product for
both types of capital




Tsur and Zemel (2009) establish the following characterization:
Proposition 1. (i) When the fossil energy price  falls short of c, no in-
vestment in solar ever takes place, s()  0, and the competitive processes
converge to a steady state (ˆ k; ˆ x) determined by conditions (2.7) and (2.9). (ii)
When the fossil energy price  exceeds c the competitive processes converge
to an exclusively solar steady state with (ˇ k; ˇ x) determined by conditions (2.9)
and (2.11), where ˇ xf = 0 and ˇ s = ˇ x=b.
Economies satisfying condition (i) are referred to as fossil-based economies,
while those satisfying condition (ii) are called solar-based. These terms de-
scribe long term behavior. In the interim, when the initial capital stock k0
is small, energy is derived exclusively from fossil sources and investment in
solar capital is delayed (or avoided if the economy is fossil-based), while fossil
energy use is determined by (2.8).
2.2 Regulation
The discussion so far has focused on the economic and technological aspects
of the distinction between fossil and solar technologies, ignoring the externali-
ties associated with the use of the former, due, e.g. to the polluting emissions
4it entails. A common policy addressing such externalities entails imposing
Pigouvian taxes on emissions. In our setting, such a policy is equivalent to
increasing the fossil price . If the “carbon tax”  is imposed abruptly, the
parties will respond promptly by switching from the competitive processes cor-
responding to the initial (low) price l to the higher price h = l+. Imposing
such a policy by surprise entails discontinuities in the consumption and saving
processes, which may raise political opposition. Support-seeking regulators,
thus, may choose to announce the tax policy well ahead of its actual implemen-
tation in order to allow agents to adjust gradually to the forthcoming changes.
The early announcement eﬀects of this policy were shown by Smulders et al.
(2009) to give rise to a ‘green paradox’, whereby the use of fossil energy will ac-
tually increase, rather than decrease, during the intermediate period between
the announcement of the tax policy and its actual implementation. This re-
sult holds both when the tax rate leaves the originally fossil-based economy at
the same type classiﬁcation (albeit less energy intensive) and when  is large
enough to bring h well above the critical price c of (2.6), turning the economy
into a solar-based type. In both cases, agents know the implementation date
precisely and adjust their behavior so as to ensure a smooth consumption pro-
cess, even though this entails results that diametrically oppose the regulator’s
original aim.
Here we extend the analysis to situations where the regulator announces
the intention to levy the tax, but is unable or unwilling to commit to a speciﬁc
date of implementing it. When the policy actually takes place, it implies a
prompt adjustment to the higher fossil energy price and discontinuous disrup-
tions cannot be avoided. The agents’ response, therefore, diﬀers from that
following a pre-speciﬁed (known) implementation date. We refer to this sce-
nario as ‘uncertain announcement’ and investigate whether it can also give rise
to paradoxical outcomes. We restrict attention to the case of a mild tax rate
which leaves the economy as a fossil-based type also after the tax is imposed.
Higher tax rates implying a transition to solar-type economies entail a more
tedious analysis, but the paradoxical eﬀects are expected to be driven by the
same mechanism, as in Smulders et al. (2009).
2.3 Allocation dynamics
The analysis is based on a comparison of the competitive processes follow-
ing an uncertain announcement to those corresponding to a ﬁxed low price l
free of regulation. Here we characterize the latter processes. Employing the



















Net production, then, can be expressed as a function of capital only:
y   x = (1   














  =(1   
) < 1 (2.15)
is the eﬀective capital share and










decreases in the fossil price . Fossil based economies with diﬀerent fossil
prices follow the same dynamics, diﬀering only in the parameter A(). The
optimization problem (2.4), thus, reduces to a single state (k) and single con-
trol (c) problem whose solution is governed by the pair of dynamic equations
˙ k = A()k
   k   c (2.17)
and
˙ c = c(c)[A()k





is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The steady state (ˆ k;ˆ c) of this system is given by the relations
A()ˆ k
−1 =  +  (2.20)
and
ˆ c = A()ˆ k
   ˆ k = ˆ k[( + )=   ]  r∞ˆ k; (2.21)
where
r∞ = ( + )=    (2.22)
6is independent of . The steady state consumption-capital relation coincides
with the straight line ˆ c = r∞ˆ k for all values of the fossil price below the critical
price c.
For the autonomous system at hand we can write c = c(k), hence ˙ c = c′(k)˙ k





A()k   ( + )k
A()k   k   c(k)
: (2.23)
Combined with the boundary condition c(ˆ k) = ˆ c, equation (2.23) determines
consumption for every positive capital stock:2
Proposition 2. If (c) < 1 for all c then the c() curve lies above the
straight line c = r∞k for all k 2 (0;ˆ k) and it lies below this straight line for
all k > ˆ k.3
Proof. At k = ˆ k, c(ˆ k) = r∞ˆ k and equation (2.23) cannot be used directly to
determine c′ because both numerator and denominator vanish. However, c′(ˆ k)




′   r∞(ˆ c)[ + ](1   ) = 0 (2.24)
with Θ(0) < 0, while Θ(r∞) = r∞(r∞ + )(1   )(1   (ˆ c)) > 0 hence the
positive root c′(ˆ k) of (2.24) is smaller than r∞. Just below ˆ k, then, the c()
curve lies above the straight line c = r∞k. Suppose that the two curves cross
at some state 0 < ˜ k < ˆ k where c(˜ k) = r∞˜ k. Then c′(˜ k)  r∞. However, at ˜ k
we can use (2.22) and (2.23) to obtain
c
′(˜ k) = (r∞˜ k)r∞
A()˜ k   ( + )˜ k
A()˜ k   ( + r∞)˜ k
= (r∞˜ k)r∞ < r∞; (2.25)
and the curves cannot cross. The relation at k > ˆ k is established in a sym-
metric manner.
2Strictly speaking, (2.23) corresponds to the market solution only for k  ˆ k. For our
purpose, however, it turns out expedient to characterize the properties of its formal solutions
also at larger capital stocks.
3Symmetric considerations show that if (c) > 1 for all c then the relation between c()
and the straight line c = r∞k is reversed. In this work we maintain the condition (c) < 1
cited in the Proposition, because it corresponds to any empirically relevant calibration.
72.4 Diﬀerent fossil energy prices
Next we compare two unregulated c() curves corresponding to diﬀerent
fossil prices. We consider the prices h > l and use the superscripts h and
l to denote all quantities associated with the high and low price, respectively.
We assume that even the higher price h is insuﬃcient to induce the economy
to use solar energy, hence the dynamics of the previous subsection hold for
both processes. Observe that r∞ is independent of  and the steady-states
corresponding to both fuel prices lie on the straight line c = r∞k. According
to (2.20), ˆ kl > ˆ kh and therefore ˆ cl is proportionately larger than ˆ ch.
According to Proposition 2, cl(ˆ kh) > r∞ˆ kh = ch(ˆ kh), hence the low-
price consumption curve lies above its high-price counterpart at k = ˆ kh. We
establish now that this property holds for all capital stocks.
Proposition 3. If (c) < 1 for all c then the cl() curve lies above the ch()
curve for all k > 0.
Proof. The Proposition holds for k = ˆ kh. Suppose that the two curves cross
at some point (˜ k;˜ c) with ˜ k 2 (0;ˆ kh). It follows that dcl(˜ k)=dk  dch(˜ k)=dk.
Using (2.23) we ﬁnd
A(l)˜ k   ( + )˜ k
A(l)˜ k   ˜ k   ˜ c

A(h)˜ k   ( + )˜ k
A(h)˜ k   ˜ k   ˜ c
: (2.26)
All terms of (2.26) are positive, because both k and c increase below their
corresponding steady states. Thus,
( + )˜ kA(
h) + (˜ k + ˜ c)A(
l)  ( + )˜ kA(
l) + (˜ k + ˜ c)A(
h):
or
(˜ k + ˜ c)[A(
l)   A(
h)]  ( + )˜ k[A(
l)   A(
h)]:
Now, A(l) > A(h), yielding
(˜ k + ˜ c)  ( + )˜ k
or, using (2.22)
˜ c  r∞˜ k;
violating Proposition 2. It follows that the two consumption curves do not
meet in the interval (0;ˆ kh].
At k > ˆ kh the inequality (2.26) and the signs of its terms are reversed, but
a crossing of the consumption curves can be ruled out via the same consider-
ations, recalling that the curves lie below the straight line c = r∞k when the
capital stock k exceeds their respective steady states.
8Proposition 3 lies at the core of the early announcement eﬀects studied in
Smulders et al. (2009). We proceed now to investigate how the analysis can
be extended to study uncertain announcements.
3 Uncertain implementation date
Suppose that implementation of the carbon tax , under which the price
of fossil energy increases from l to h = l + , is considered to take place
at some unknown future date T. The realization of T may depend on the
successful ratiﬁcation and implementation of some international treaty, or on
other developments in the global arena, and is taken as exogenous to the
economy under consideration. Thus, from the vantage point of the economy,
the hazard rate  corresponding to the random T is constant. The payoﬀ,














subject to (2.17), given k(0) = k. Note that dv(kjh)=dk = h(k) = u′(ch(k)),
where h is the current-value shadow price of capital under the optimal policy
corresponding to v(kjh).



























subject to (2.17) with  = l, given k(0) = k0. We compare the emission
path corresponding to v(k0jl), under which no carbon tax is contemplated,
with that corresponding to v(k0jl;h), under which a carbon tax  will be
imposed at an uncertain time T.
9The capital process k() corresponding to v(k0jl;h) follows (2.17) with






















Comparing (3.3) with (2.18), we see that the uncertainty in T, with  > 0,
is represented by the P(k) term, the sign of which depends on the relative
magnitudes of ch(k) and c(k). We turn now to study the eﬀects of this term.
3.1 The consumption-capital trajectory







A(l)k−1   ( + ) + P(k)
A(l)k   k   c(k)
; (3.5)




   ˆ k
   ˆ c





−1   ( + ) + P(ˆ k
) = 0: (3.7)
We compare these steady state values with their regulation-free counterparts.




−1   (ˆ k
)
−1] = P(ˆ k
): (3.8)




) = ˆ c








With u′′() < 0, it follows that u′(c(ˆ k)) < u′(ch(ˆ k)) and P(ˆ k) > 0. Turn-
ing again to (3.8) and recalling that    1 < 0, we ﬁnd that ˆ k > ˆ kl when
the hazard rate  is small. We show that this relation between the steady
states extends to arbitrary positive values of . Consider the steady state ˆ k
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Figure 1: The steady state capital ˆ k as a function of the hazard rate . The
upper and lower horizontal lines indicate ˆ kl and ˆ kh, respectively. The curves
in all ﬁgures were derived under the above functions speciﬁcations and the
parameter values:  = 
 = 1=3; F = 1;  = 1;  =  = 5% annually, l = 1
and h = 2.
constant ˆ kl so that the left hand side of (3.8) vanishes. However, (3.6) holds
for both c() and cl() hence c(ˆ k) = cl(ˆ k) > ch(ˆ k). According to (3.4)
P(ˆ k) > 0 hence the right hand side of (3.8) is positive, while the left hand
side vanishes. Thus, the crossing cannot occur. We conclude, therefore that
ˆ k
 > ˆ k
l 8 > 0; (3.9)
as Figure 1 illustrates.
Next we compare the complete consumption curves by relating c(k) to
cl(k). Since ˆ kl represents the steady state for the kl() process, it follows
that ˙ kl(t) = 0 at this state. However, the steady state ˆ k of k() exceeds
ˆ kl, hence ˙ k(t) > 0 when k(t) = ˆ kl. Thus, (2.17) implies cl(ˆ kl) > c(ˆ kl).
We show that this relation cannot reverse at other capital states. Suppose
otherwise, that cl(k∗) = c(k∗) (hence P(k∗) > 0) at some capital state k∗ < ˆ kl
but cl(k) > c(k) 8k 2 (k∗;ˆ kl]. It follows that dcl(k∗)=dk  dc(k∗)=dk.
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Figure 2: Consumption curves as functions of capital under uncertain T (c),
low fossil energy price (cl) and high fossil energy price (ch). In this and the
following ﬁgures we use the value  = 0:1 corresponding to EfTg = 10 years.
because the denominator of the second term is also positive at k∗. A crossing
of the consumption curves (with dcl(k∗)=dk  dc(k∗)=dk) can be ruled out
also for k∗ > ˆ kl using the same argument, since the denominator is negative
above ˆ kl. Thus,
c
(k) < c
l(k) 8k > 0:
We wish to compare the uncertain consumption curve also to its high price
counterpart, ch(). We use (3.9) to deduce from (3.8) that P(ˆ k) > 0 hence
ch(ˆ k) < c(ˆ k). To establish the same relation for smaller capital stocks, we
assume otherwise, that ch(˜ k) = c(˜ k) at some stock ˜ k < ˆ k, where dch(˜ k)=dk 
dc(˜ k)=dk but P(˜ k) = 0. This, however, implies (2.26) which can be ruled
out via the same arguments used to establish Proposition 3. We summarize
these considerations in Figure 2 and in
Proposition 4. If (c) < 1 8c, then ch(k) < c(k) < cl(k) 8k 2 (0;ˆ k].
Uncertainty, then, reduces consumption but not by as much as would be
implied by a prompt implementation of the tax.
123.2 The “Green Paradox”













A(l)k   k   c(k)
dk:
Thus, the relation cl(k) > c(k) implies that
k
l(t) < k
(t) 8t > 0;
as indicated in Figure 3. Indeed, this result provides the manifestation of the
“Green Paradox” eﬀect in the case of uncertain T. Since both kl() and k()
proceed under the same price of fossil energy and with the same production
technology, the larger k() process entails enhanced energy use at each point
of time (until implementation), in contrast to the original purpose of the an-
nouncement. As in the case of a certain early announcement, preparing for
the anticipated tax consists of accumulating a larger capital stock so that when
the tax is eventually levied, the larger capital stock will partly compensate for
the reduced energy use implied by the tax.
Interestingly, a comparison of the corresponding consumption time trajec-
tories does not display the same simple pattern in time: With a higher steady
state consumption, c(t) must exceed cl(t) at large time (but prior to actual
implementation). This relation between the consumption processes, however,
cannot extend all the way back to t = 0 (when the capital stock equals k0 un-
der both regimes) because if it did, the relation between the capital processes
displayed in Figure 3 would be reversed. The two consumption processes,
therefore, must cross at some ﬁnite time, as shown in Figure 4. Eﬀorts to
prepare for the tax (in terms of reduced consumption) are concentrated at the
early stages of the growth process, while at later times, parts of the fruits of
the oversized capital (relative to the prevailing low fossil energy price) are used
again to ﬁnance enhanced consumption.
4 Concluding comments
The model presented in this work suggests yet another mechanism to
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Figure 3: Capital time trajectories under uncertain T (k) and low fossil energy
price (kl).
scarcity of the fossil resource. Here, the eﬀects are due to uncertainty regard-
ing the timing of introducing the carbon tax. While the economic forces at
work are similar to those driving the early announcement model of Smulders
et al. (2009), the two mechanisms operate diﬀerently because in the present
model economic agents cannot predict the tax implementation date at which
they must ensure a smooth transition of the consumption process. In fact,
consumption will undergo a discontinuous jump on this date and the adopted
processes are tuned so as to minimize the expected utility loss associated with
the jump. The solution involves delicate tradeoﬀs as manifested by the cross-
ing of the time proﬁles of the consumption processes displayed in Figure 4.
Nevertheless, the “paradoxical” eﬀect of increased fossil energy use persists at
all times until the tax policy is realized.
For brevity and simplicity of exposition, the results are presented in terms
of the simplest speciﬁcation of a Cobb-Douglas technology, constant hazard
rate and a mild tax rate which does not imply a transition to a solar-based
economy. As indicated by Smulders et al. (2009), none of these assumptions
is essential and the “paradoxical” eﬀect can be obtained in a more general
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Figure 4: Consumption time trajectories under uncertain T (c) and low fossil
energy price (cl). The arrow indicates the time when the trajectories cross.
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